Kubernetes attacks

SkillCloud & infra

Attack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals, ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.

Instructions available. Your AI can read the instructions. Execution depends on the setup they require.

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Then ask your AI: use the Kubernetes attacks skill

What this skill tells your AI

The instructions your AI receives, as published by noorqureshi/sploitagent in skills/cloud/cloud-kubernetes/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.

When it applies

A Kubernetes control-plane or node component is reachable (externally or from a pod foothold), or you landed in a container inside a cluster and want to escalate to cluster admin / other tenants.

Why it works

k8s exposes powerful HTTP APIs that are frequently unauthenticated or over-permissioned: anonymous API access, kubelet read/exec on 10250, unauth etcd (all secrets), and mounted service-account tokens with broad RBAC. One over-scoped token = cluster takeover.

Method

From outside: kube-hunter; probe API server 6443 (/api/v1 anonymous), kubelet 10250 (/pods, /run exec), etcd 2379 (keys→secrets), and exposed dashboards (8443/anonymous).
From a pod: read the mounted token /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/; kubectl auth can-i --list to see what it grants.
Escalate via RBAC: over-permissioned SA → create/exec pods, read secrets across namespaces, or create pods with a hostPath/privileged spec to mount the node (→ node/cluster takeover).
Container→node breakout: privileged pod, hostPID/hostNetwork, or a hostPath mount to the host filesystem (→ cloud-container-escape).
Loot: kubectl get secrets -A, cloud IAM via node metadata (→ cloud-imds-ssrf).

Gotchas

kubectl auth can-i --list first — it tells you exactly what the token can do; don't guess.
Anonymous API/kubelet is common in labs and misconfigured clusters — always test unauth.
On bug bounty, prove access read-only where possible; creating privileged pods is high-impact — mind RoE.

Verify success

Cluster-level access proven: reading secrets across namespaces, exec into others' pods, or node filesystem/cloud-creds access from an over-scoped token.

References

kube-hunter/peirates; NCC "Kubernetes security"; MITRE ATT&CK Containers.

Signals

GitHub stars: 20
Forks: 7
Last commit: Sep 2026

ahel review

S4info
community integration, published by noorqureshi, not kubernetes

Automated review, not a security audit. Ruleset v1+k2.

Advanced

Item type: skill
Key: cloud-kubernetes
Source: github.com/noorqureshi/sploitagent

github.com/noorqureshi/sploitagent