Ruby / Rails source review
SkillSecuritySecurity review of Ruby code, dangerous sinks and Rails pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Ruby/Rails codebase/PR, on .rb source in scope, or "review this Rails app". Signals: Gemfile, config/routes.rb, ActiveRecord, ERB, YAML.load, send/constantize.
Instructions available. Your AI can read the instructions. Execution depends on the setup they require.
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What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by noorqureshi/sploitagent in skills/code-review/code-review-ruby/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.
When it applies
Reviewing Ruby source, usually Rails. Rails is safe by default in many places, so the bugs cluster in dynamic dispatch, mass assignment gaps, raw SQL, and unsafe deserialization/rendering.
Why it works
Ruby's metaprogramming (send, constantize, eval) turns strings into method/class/code
references, and Rails helpers have unsafe escape hatches (.html_safe, where("...#{x}..."),
render inline:). Tracing params to these is the whole game — and Brakeman automates the first pass.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)
- Code exec:
eval,instance_eval,class_eval, backticks/system/%x/exec/open("|…"). - Dynamic dispatch:
send/public_send/__send__with a param method name;constantize/safe_constantizeon input (arbitrary class instantiation). - SQLi: string interpolation in
where("name = '#{x}'"),find_by_sql,order(params[:sort]),pluck/groupwith input. - Mass assignment: missing/loose Strong Parameters (
params.permit!,permit(*keys)). - Deserialization:
YAML.load(vssafe_load),Marshal.load,Ojin compat mode on input. - XSS/SSRF/render:
.html_safe/rawon user data,render inline:/render text:with input,open/Net::HTTPon user URLs,send_file/params[:path]traversal.
Framework specifics
- Rails:
permit/requirecorrectness,skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token(CSRF),redirect_to params[...](open redirect), route globbing exposing actions, secrets incredentials/ENV, defaultprotect_from_forgerydisabled on APIs.
Method
- Run
brakemanandbundler-audit; triage the warnings (Brakeman is high-signal for Rails). rg 'send\(|constantize|eval|where\(".*#\{|html_safe|YAML.load|render.*inline'→ trace to params.- Check every controller's strong-params and
before_actionauth coverage. - Confirm exploitable findings with
web-sqli,web-deserialization,web-ssrf,web-idor.
Gotchas
sendto a fixed symbol is fine; the bug issend(params[:action]).YAML.safe_loadis safe; plainYAML.loadon input is RCE-capable.- Brakeman false positives exist — always confirm the param actually reaches the sink.
References
Brakeman docs; Rails Security Guide; OWASP Ruby on Rails cheat sheet.
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 20
- Forks
- 7
- Last commit
- Sep 2026
Advanced
- Item type
- skill
- Key
code-review-ruby- Source
- github.com/noorqureshi/sploitagent
github.com/noorqureshi/sploitagent
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