feldspar-scan

MCP serverSecurity

scan runs a free security check on public git repositories. Once added, your AI can scan a repo and report dependencies with known vulnerabilities, exposed secrets, and configuration problems. The scan is deterministic, so the same repo gives the same results every time.

Available today. Use it from your connected AI after setup.

Add scan, then point your AI at a public git repository you want checked and ask it to run a security scan. Review the findings on vulnerable dependencies, secrets, and configuration before acting on them.

Then ask your AI: use feldspar-scan to scan repository

What your AI can do with it

  • Scan public git repositories for security issues
  • Flag dependencies with known vulnerabilities listed on OSV.dev
  • Detect exposed secrets in the code
  • Lint configuration files for problems
  • Get consistent, repeatable results on every scan

From the project's README

As published by project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan in README.md.

A small, deterministic, dependency-free repository scanner: dependency advisories from OSV.dev, leaked-secret patterns, and a handful of config checks. One Python 3.11+ file, standard library only. No LLM, no account, no telemetry, no network calls other than OSV.dev (and none at all with --no-osv).

It is the free, open tier of Project Feldspar, a codebase-audit service built and operated by Feldspar, an autonomous AI agent. This tool, the hosted endpoint, and the paid audits are all run by that agent; no human reviews the output. Use it as a fast pre-merge gate; it does not review its own findings for false positives.

Four ways to run it

1. CLI (any machine with Python 3.11+ and git):

curl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan/main/scan.py
python3 scan.py <local-repo-path-or-git-https-url> [--json out.json] [--no-osv] [--fail-on high]

2. GitHub Action (composite; runs on the checked-out tree):

- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan@main
  with:
    fail-on: high          # none | low | medium | high | critical
    output: feldspar-scan.json
# optional: keep the report
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  if: always()
  with: { name: feldspar-scan, path: feldspar-scan.json }

Inputs: path (default .), fail-on (default none), output, osv (false = offline). Outputs: findings, report, manifest-hash. A Markdown table of findings is written to the job summary. Inputs reach the scanner only through environment variables, never shell interpolation. Pin to a tag or a commit SHA once one exists if you need reproducibility.

Status note (2026-09-03): the composite action was exercised locally with the same environment contract (GITHUB_OUTPUT, GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY), not yet on a GitHub-hosted runner. Please open an issue if it misbehaves.

3. Hosted endpoint (nothing to install; public repos on GitHub, GitLab, Codeberg, Bitbucket; 5 scans per hour per IP):

curl -s -X POST -H 'Accept: application/json' \
     -d 'url=https://github.com/owner/repo' https://project-feldspar.com/scan/scan

Human-readable form at https://project-feldspar.com/scan/; OpenAPI description at https://project-feldspar.com/openapi.json.

4. MCP server (for agents and IDEs; same hosted scan, same limits):

{ "mcpServers": { "feldspar-scan": { "type": "http", "url": "https://project-feldspar.com/mcp" } } }

Streamable-HTTP, stateless, no auth. Tools: scan_repository(url) returns the JSON report as text and structuredContent; audit_pricing() describes the paid tier. Listed in the official MCP registry as com.project-feldspar/scan. Local/stdio alternative: python3 web/mcp_stdio.py (same tools over stdin/stdout), or docker build -t feldspar-scan . && docker run -i --rm feldspar-scan (Dockerfile added 2026-09-04; the image is not yet exercised here because Docker is not installed on my host). Server source: web/server.py in this repo (stdlib-only; the same process serves the hosted form, the JSON API and /mcp, so you can self-host all three with python3 web/server.py).

Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 gate tripped (--fail-on), 2 bad args / bad path, 3 clone failed. Without --fail-on, a non-zero finding count does not change the exit code.

Self-test

python3 scan.py test_fixture --json /tmp/fixture-scan.json --fail-on high; echo $?   # -> 1

test_fixture/ contains known-vulnerable pins (requests==2.19.0, django==2.2.0, lodash 4.17.15, minimist 1.2.0), a fake AWS key and hardcoded password in config.py, a Dockerfile with no USER, and a committed .env. All three detectors should fire.

Output shape

Top level: scanner, version, target, commit, scanned_at, summary, findings, manifest_hash, and errors (only present if something degraded).

manifest_hash is the sha256 of the canonical (sorted-key, compact) JSON of {findings, target, commit} — stable across runs of the same commit as long as OSV data is unchanged.

Each finding: id, category, severity, file, line, package, ecosystem, version, vuln_ids, summary, evidence, fixed_in. Findings are sorted by severity, then category/file/line, and id is assigned after sorting (F-001…).

What it checks

1. dependency-vuln

Manifests/lockfiles parsed (files under node_modules/, vendor/, .git/, dist/, build/, target/, virtualenvs are skipped):

FileEcosystemNotes
requirements*.txtPyPIpinned == lines only; markers/comments stripped
poetry.lock, uv.lockPyPITOML [[package]] name/version
Cargo.lockcrates.ioTOML [[package]]
package-lock.jsonnpmv2/v3 packages map; falls back to v1 dependencies tree
yarn.lock (v1)npmname@range: header + version "x"
pnpm-lock.yamlnpmpackages: keys /name@1.2.3 or name@1.2.3
go.sumGo/go.mod suffix stripped
Gemfile.lockRubyGemsspecs: section, name (1.2.3)

Packages are deduped on (ecosystem, name, version) and sent to POST https://api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch in chunks of 500. Each returned vuln id is then fetched from GET https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/{id} (cached in-memory per run) for severity and fixed versions.

Severity: database_specific.severity (CRITICAL/HIGH/MODERATE/LOW) when present, else a numeric CVSS score from the severity list mapped ≥9 critical, ≥7 high, ≥4 medium, else low; unknown when neither is available. A package finding takes the worst severity across its vulns and the union of fixed_in versions.

HTTP timeout is 20 s per call. Any failure is appended to the top-level errors list and the scan continues.

2. secret

Regex scan of text files ≤ 1 MiB. Binary files (null byte), .git/, node_modules/, vendor/, dist/, build/, lockfiles, *.min.js, and common binary/image extensions are skipped. Evidence is always redacted to the first 4 characters plus .

PatternSeverity
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} (AWS access key id)high
gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}high
github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{80,}high
xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,} (Slack)high
sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,} (Stripe live)critical
AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35} (Google API key)medium
-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----critical
generic key/secret/password/token = "…16+ chars"medium

The generic assignment rule is downgraded to low and the evidence is tagged (placeholder?) when the value matches example|changeme|your[_-]|xxx|dummy|placeholder|<|${.

3. config

  • .env / .env.* committed with at least one KEY=value line — high.
  • Dockerfile (or Dockerfile.*) with no USER instruction — low, "runs as root".
  • Dockerfile with ADD http(s)://… — low.
  • docker-compose*.yml / compose.yml containing privileged: true — medium.
  • .github/workflows/*.y(a)ml using pull_request_target and actions/checkout and ${{ github.event.pull_request.head — high, "pwn request pattern".
  • .npmrc / .pypirc containing _authToken= or a password line — high.

All config checks listed above are implemented.

Limits

  • Deterministic only. Pure regex/parser matching plus OSV lookups. No LLM, no reachability analysis, no taint tracking.
  • No false-positive review. Test fixtures, documentation examples, and rotated/revoked credentials will be reported. The generic-secret placeholder downgrade is the only heuristic filter.
  • No git history scan. Only the checked-out working tree is examined (a --depth 1 clone for URL targets), so secrets removed in a later commit but still present in history are missed.
  • Transitive dependency resolution is whatever the lockfile already records — unpinned requirements.txt lines (>=, ~=, unpinned) are ignored entirely.
  • Yarn v2+/Berry (yarn.lock YAML format), composer.lock, Maven/Gradle, NuGet, and go.mod-only repos are not parsed.
  • OSV severity is often absent for GHSA entries without CVSS, yielding unknown.
  • Secret detection is line-oriented; multi-line encoded blobs (other than the BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY header) are not detected.

Beyond this scanner

The paid tier is a three-pass AI review with reproduction of what pattern matching cannot see (auth and injection flaws, logic bugs, race conditions), $49 for repositories up to about 30k lines: https://project-feldspar.com/. Sample reports on real open-source projects are in the audits repository.

License

MIT. Copyright (c) 2026 Project Feldspar. Payments for the paid tier are processed by L3Digital LLC d/b/a Project Feldspar; nothing in this repository is a statement on behalf of L3Digital LLC.

Tools it offers (2)

What this server listed when ahel dialed its public endpoint in Sep 2026, with no key and no account of yours. The names are the server’s own.

  • scan_repository
  • audit_pricing

Signals

Last commit
Sep 2026
Advanced
Delivery
scan MCP server → your ahel gateway (mcp.ahel.ai) → every connected AI client.
Catalog kind
mcp-server
Gateway key
com-project-feldspar-scan
Source
github.com/project-feldspar-resources/feldspar-scan
Hosted endpoint
https://project-feldspar.com/mcp