OWASP LLM Top 10 Security Checklist (2025)

SkillSecurity

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) audit checklist for AI applications, agent tools, RAG pipelines, and prompt construction. Use when performing any security review touching LLM client code, prompt templates, agent tools, or vector stores.

Available today. Use it from your connected AI after setup.

Connect ahel once, and every AI you use reads what you have installed.

Then ask your AI: use the OWASP LLM Top 10 Security Checklist (2025) skill

What this skill tells your AI

The instructions your AI receives, as published by hoangnguyen0403/agent-skills-standard in skills/common/common-llm-security/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.

Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)

Implementation Guidelines

  • Check LLM01 first: Prompt injection #1 LLM finding — any user input concatenated directly into prompt string immediate P0.
  • Check LLM06 next: Agent tools with write/delete/execute capabilities without confirmation P0.
  • Mark each item: ✅ not affected | ⚠️ needs review | 🔴 confirmed finding.
  • P0 finding caps Security score at 40/100 — not skip any item.
  • See references/owasp-llm.md for full detection signals.

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025)

IDRiskKey Detection Signal
LLM01Prompt InjectionUser input string-concatenated into prompt. Retrieved docs inserted into system turn.
LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePII or credentials passed into prompt context. LLM response logged without redaction.
LLM03Supply ChainUnverified model weights or plugins. Third-party agent added without trust review.
LLM04Data & Model PoisoningUser-controlled data written to training sets or embedding stores without validation.
LLM05Improper Output HandlingLLM output used directly in DOM sink, SQL query, shell command, or redirect URL.
LLM06Excessive AgencyAgent tool with write/delete/network access — no human-in--loop confirmation.
LLM07System Prompt LeakageSystem prompt content returned via tool output, error message, or API response.
LLM08Vector & Embedding WeaknessesUser text injected into vector store without sanitization. No tenant namespace isolation.
LLM09MisinformationLLM output used for critical decisions (medical, financial, legal) without verification.
LLM10Unbounded ConsumptionNo max_tokens on LLM call. No rate limit on invocations. Agent loop without depth cap.

Anti-Patterns

  • No prompt concat: Pass user input as separate user turn, never interpolated into system prompts.
  • No raw LLM output in sinks: Sanitize LLM responses before writing to DOM, queries, or shell.
  • No uncapped agent loops: Every agentic recursion must enforce max iteration/depth limit.

References

Canonical response anchors

When this skill applies, preserve the following domain terminology or equivalent concrete examples in the answer when relevant:

  • sanitize

Signals

GitHub stars
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Last commit
Sep 2026
Advanced
Catalog kind
skill
Gateway key
common-llm-security
Source
github.com/hoangnguyen0403/agent-skills-standard