Cross-Site Request Forgery Check (A01:2025)

What this checks

Protects against cross-site request forgery, where an attacker tricks an authenticated user's browser into submitting a state-changing request the user did not intend. Exploitation leads to unauthorized fund transfers, account takeover, or privilege escalation.

Vulnerable patterns

• HTML form posting a state-changing request with no CSRF token hidden field
• Framework CSRF protection explicitly disabled or exempted on a state-changing endpoint
• Session cookie issued without a SameSite attribute (Lax or Strict)
• Web app with no CSRF middleware registered for cookie-authenticated state-changing routes
• Cookie-authenticated API endpoint accepting POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE with no token check

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Then suggest a fix that establishes these properties:

1. Every state-changing endpoint (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) validates a per-session or per-request CSRF token server-side before any mutation. Use the framework's documented CSRF middleware — do not roll your own.
2. Framework CSRF protection is never disabled or exempted on a state-changing route. If a route legitimately needs to opt out (a pure JSON API authenticated by Authorization: Bearer headers, not cookies), the opt-out must be explicit and the cookie-auth path must remain protected.
3. Session cookies carry SameSite=Lax at minimum, or SameSite=Strict for sensitive flows, plus Secure and HttpOnly. This blocks cross-origin cookie attachment on top-level navigations or subrequests that don't need it.
4. CSRF tokens are not exposed in URLs, logs, or Referer headers — they live in a hidden form field or a dedicated request header, never in the query string.
5. Forms include the token via the framework's template helper, so the token binds to the session and is rotated as the framework intends.

Translate these principles to the audited file's language and framework. Use the documented CSRF middleware and template helpers for that stack — do not hand-build token comparison logic.

Verification

Confirm the following properties hold (language-agnostic):

• Every state-changing endpoint (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) is protected by a CSRF token validated server-side
• No framework CSRF middleware is disabled or bypassed on a cookie-authenticated state-changing route
• Session cookies include SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Strict attribute
• CSRF tokens are not leaked in URLs, logs, or Referer headers
• API-only endpoints using token-based auth (Bearer header) may skip CSRF tokens, but cookie-authenticated endpoints must not

References

• CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
• OWASP A01:2025 Broken Access Control