Dependency Upgrade
SkillSecurityBring dependencies current without breaking the build: find what is vulnerable, deprecated or behind, classify each target version by risk, apply what is safe, verify, and roll back what is not.
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What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by byerlikaya/claude-starter-kit in plugin/skills/dependency-upgrade/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.
Trigger phrases: "upgrade dependencies", "outdated packages", "bump versions", "update packages", "keep dependencies current"
When
Staying on current versions as an ongoing practice, or reacting to a CVE. [[dependency-audit]] tells you what is wrong; this decides what to do about it and does it. It mutates the manifest and the lockfile, so it carries the same shape as [[db-migration]]: detect the tool, classify by risk, gate the dangerous class behind approval, apply, verify, roll back on red.
1 — Ask the three separate questions
They are three different problems with three different answers, and the tooling keeps them separate too.
| Question | Node | .NET | Python |
|---|---|---|---|
| What has a known CVE? | npm audit --json | dotnet list package --vulnerable | pip-audit |
| What is deprecated? | npm view <pkg> deprecated | dotnet list package --deprecated | registry / project notes |
| What is simply behind? | npm outdated --json | dotnet list package --outdated | pip list --outdated |
The three
dotnet list packageflags cannot be combined — it is three separate runs, not one.
Deprecated is not an upgrade. No version bump fixes it; the package needs a replacement, which is a design change with its own review — never fold it into a routine bump.
2 — Classify every target version before touching anything
The risk is not "how old is it", it is "how far does the jump go".
| Class | Rule | Approval |
|---|---|---|
| Security patch | fixes a known CVE, within the current major | Do it first, on its own commit — it is the one upgrade whose delay has a cost |
Patch (x.y.Z) | bugfix only | Apply, batched |
Minor (x.Y.z) | additive, backward compatible by promise | Apply, batched, only if the suite is green afterwards |
Major (X.y.z) | breaking by definition | Never automatic. Read the changelog/migration guide, one package per commit, and say what breaks |
| Pinned / transitive-only | pinned deliberately, or not a direct dependency | Leave it. Find out why it is pinned before unpinning |
Semver is a promise, not a guarantee: a minor that breaks you is a bug in the package, and your suite is the only thing that will tell you. That is why the verify step below is not optional.
3 — Apply
- Group by class, one commit per group — a patch batch and a major are not the same change and must not share a commit. A single commit mixing forty bumps is unreviewable and unrevertable.
- Preview first.
npm audit fix --dry-runbeforenpm audit fix. Never reach fornpm audit fix --forcewithout saying so out loud: it installs semver-major upgrades, which is precisely how this task breaks a build while claiming to be a security fix. - The lockfile is part of the change. Commit it with the manifest; a manifest bump without its lockfile is a change nobody else reproduces ([[dependency-audit]] axis 5).
- Never hand-edit a lockfile. Let the tool regenerate it.
4 — Verify, then decide
Nothing counts as upgraded until it is observed working — install, build, full test suite, and the project's quality gate. Run the app's real entry path if the change touches runtime, not just unit tests ([[testing]]).
- Green → keep it.
- Red → roll back this group (
git checkout -- <manifest> <lockfile>then reinstall), then either pin, split the batch to find the culprit, or move that package to its own major-upgrade task. Do not "fix forward" a routine bump; that turns maintenance into an unplanned feature. - Re-run [[dependency-audit]] afterwards: an upgrade can introduce a new transitive CVE.
5 — Continuous, without an autonomous loop
"Always current" is a cadence, not an agent that runs by itself — the kit has no timed or self-triggering loops, because every mutation here needs an approval a loop cannot give. Continuity comes from somewhere that already has a human gate at the end:
- A scheduled CI job running the step-1 commands and failing on HIGH/CRITICAL ([[ci-pipeline]]).
- Or a bot (Renovate / Dependabot) opening one PR per group — the kit does not reimplement it; the value added is the policy above deciding which PRs merge on green and which need a human to read a changelog.
- Either way the PR passes through the ordinary gates: build, tests, [[security-scan]], review, approval.
DoD
- Vulnerable, deprecated and outdated were asked as three separate questions, with the command output shown.
- Every applied upgrade is classed patch / minor / major, and no major went in automatically or unexplained.
- Security fixes landed first and separately.
- Manifest and lockfile moved together; no lockfile was hand-edited.
- Build + full suite were observed green after the change, or the group was rolled back and named.
- Deprecated packages are reported as replacement work, not silently bumped.
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 22
- Forks
- 4
- Last commit
- Sep 2026
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dependency-upgrade- Source
- github.com/byerlikaya/claude-starter-kit