AgentGuards — enforced by hooks

This plugin has no MCP server, so there is no check_input, authorize_action or health_check tool — do not look for them, they are not installed.

That is not reduced protection. The hooks in hooks/hooks.json enforce deterministically, on every request, whatever the model does:

• UserPromptSubmit screens every prompt before you see it.
• PreToolUse authorizes every shell command before it runs: denied, or allowed, or left to Codex's own approval prompt.
• PermissionRequest rides that approval prompt: it denies what AgentGuards rejects and remembers what the user approved for the rest of the session.
• PostToolUse scans the output of shell commands that fetch (curl, wget, http, fetch, aria2c — also behind sudo, timeout, bash -c, $(...)), withholding or redacting it before you read it, and scans apply_patch edits for vulnerabilities and secrets.

Nothing here requires you to call a tool, check a decision, or format a block message — the hook has already acted by the time you see (or don't see) the result. If a hook blocks something, reply with its message rather than composing your own.

One limit, stated plainly: Codex's built-in web search runs on OpenAI's servers, not on this machine, so no hook ever sees its results. Content fetched with a shell command is screened; built-in web search results are not.

To check that the guardrails are on, use the status skill. To set the API key, use the setup skill.