Integrate webhook

Webhooks drive a transfer's lifecycle after the quote: awaiting_payment → settling → completed | failed | expired. Implement one WebhookProcessor in apps/sdp-api/src/routes/webhooks/ramps/<id>.ts using the interface in processor.ts:

• verify(context) — verify the signature, return the parsed payload.
• parse(payload) — pure wire-format → RampSettlementEvent mapping.
• process(c, environment, event) — DB orchestration; calls applyRampSettlementEvent.

Canonical examples: the registered processors in apps/sdp-api/src/routes/webhooks/ramps/ — read the closest one before writing yours.

Mount + flow

Webhooks are not under /v1. They land at POST /webhooks/payments/ramps/{sandbox|production}/:provider. parseRampWebhookProvider accepts an id only after registration in apps/sdp-api/src/routes/webhooks/handlers.ts. The handler reads the raw body → verifies → parses → returns 2xx → runs process through c.executionCtx.waitUntil.

verify

verify(context: RampWebhookValidationContext): Promise<Payload>. context = { env, environment, headers, rawBody, requestUrl? }. Read the mode-keyed verification secret/key from env, verify the signature over the raw body, then JSON.parse and return the payload. Throw UNAUTHORIZED on a missing/invalid signature; throw badRequest on non-JSON. Use apps/sdp-api/src/lib/webhook-signature.ts and supply the upstream timestamp as timestampSeconds; the helper enforces replay tolerance as well as signature verification.

The shared verifier currently supports HMAC-SHA256 and ECDSA P-256/SHA-256, and it requires a provider-signed timestamp. If the upstream uses another algorithm or does not sign a timestamp, stop and extend/review the shared verification contract; do not fabricate a local timestamp or bypass replay protection.

This is one of the few places unknown is allowed — it's a genuine trust boundary, narrowed immediately by parse.

Signature variety across the six registered webhook providers:

Provider	Header	Algorithm	Env keys
Lightspark	x-grid-signature	ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256 (public key)	LIGHTSPARK_GRID_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY / LIGHTSPARK_GRID_SANDBOX_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY
MoonPay	moonpay-signature-v2	HMAC-SHA256 (hex, t=…,s=…)	MOONPAY_WEBHOOK_KEY / MOONPAY_SANDBOX_WEBHOOK_KEY
BVNK	x-signature	HMAC-SHA256 (base64)	BVNK_WEBHOOK_SECRET / BVNK_SANDBOX_WEBHOOK_SECRET
Coinbase	x-hook0-signature	HMAC-SHA256 (hex, t=…,v0=…)	COINBASE_CDP_RAMPS_WEBHOOK_SECRET
Mural	x-mural-webhook-signature + timestamp header	ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256 (public key, base64)	MURAL_PAY_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY / MURAL_PAY_SANDBOX_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY
Stripe	stripe-signature	HMAC-SHA256 (hex, t=…,v1=…)	STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET

parse

(payload: Payload) → Event, typically RampSettlementEvent from @sdp/payments/ramps/types. Narrow the payload with readString / readRecord / readNumber from @sdp/payments/json. Map upstream event types to kind, and set reference to the quote id persisted by SDP; that is how settlement finds the transfer. Anything legitimately signed but irrelevant maps to { provider, kind: "ignore", reason }.

parse runs synchronously before the 2xx ack, so it must be total over every payload the provider can legitimately sign: unknown event types and transactions the platform didn't create (sandbox tests, manual payments on the same account) must map to an ignore event or an absent reference — never a throw, which turns into a non-2xx and a provider retry loop. Reserve throws for payloads that violate the provider's own guaranteed envelope (e.g. a missing event type), where a loud deterministic failure is the point. Example: references not minted by SDP return undefined from the processor's reference reader and get logged-and-skipped in process.

RampSettlementEvent (packages/sdp-payments/src/ramps/types.ts):

`receivedAmount` is a major/display-unit string. For a settled on-ramp it is the received crypto amount; for an off-ramp it is the received fiat amount.
| { kind: "awaiting_payment"; provider; reference }
| { kind: "settling";         provider; reference }
| { kind: "settled";          provider; reference; receivedAmount?; settlement? }
| { kind: "failed";           provider; reference; error?; settlement? }
| { kind: "expired";          provider; reference; error?; settlement? }
| { kind: "ignore";           provider; reason }

process

process(c, environment, event) is thin — ignore or apply:

async process(c: AppContext, _environment: SdpEnvironment, event: RampSettlementEvent) {
  if (event.kind === "ignore") return;
  await applyRampSettlementEvent(c, event);
}

Then register the class in RAMP_PROVIDER_WEBHOOK_PROCESSOR in apps/sdp-api/src/routes/webhooks/handlers.ts, or explicitly extend the excluded no-webhook provider union. applyRampSettlementEvent finds the transfer by (provider, reference), skips terminal rows on redelivery, maps kind → status, persists received amounts for the relevant direction plus settlement economics, and records failed/expired errors.

Beyond settlement: provisioning auto-advance

A provider whose counterparty provisioning is async (KYC verification, wallet creation) also moves requirement state from webhooks: parse returns a wider provider event union — one event kind per upstream type (customer status changes, wallet creation/status changes, payment status changes) — and process switches exhaustively on event.kind, routing settlement kinds to applyRampSettlementEvent-based helpers and provisioning kinds to helpers that update counterparty_provider_accounts rows (never counterparties.provider_data — it's deprecated). The requirements GET then reflects the advanced state (counterparty-requirements). The standard contract a new provider implements is the settlement path above; add provisioning kinds only when the upstream provisions asynchronously.

Rules + verify

Shared rules live in integrate-ramp-provider. Hot here:

• Verify the signature before trusting anything; never skip on a missing header — throw UNAUTHORIZED.
• No swallowed errors in your own logic; the orchestration owns the 2xx + background write.
• Event-type maps are as const satisfies Record<string, RampSettlementEvent["kind"]>; no any past the verify boundary.
• Verify focused webhook tests for valid, missing, malformed, stale, and replayed signatures; unknown events; duplicate terminal delivery; and settlement persistence. Run API typecheck/tests plus @sdp/payments checks when event types change.