Software and Data Integrity Failures Security Check (A08:2025)

What this checks

Protects against arbitrary code execution and tampered artifacts. Deserializing untrusted data with code-executing formats gives attackers remote code execution; unsigned software updates allow supply-chain compromise.

Vulnerable patterns

• Code-executing deserializer (Python pickle/marshal/shelve, Java ObjectInputStream, Ruby Marshal.load, PHP unserialize, .NET BinaryFormatter, unsafe YAML loader) called on attacker-reachable bytes
• Deserialized object whose fields are read by business logic with no schema validation of names, types, or allowed values
• Software update, plugin, or CI artifact downloaded and executed without signature or digest verification
• Trusting reduce/wakeup-style reconstruction hooks invoked on user-controlled serialized blobs
• Verification key or pinned hash hardcoded as a string literal in source rather than loaded from a trusted external source

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Translate the principles below to the audited file's language and serialization library — use that stack's documented safe-loader, schema-validation, and signature-verification APIs.

For each finding, establish these properties:

1. No code-executing deserializer touches untrusted input. Replace it with a data-only format — JSON, safe-mode YAML, protobuf, CBOR without tags — so parsing alone cannot trigger constructor or callback execution.
2. Every deserialized object from untrusted input is validated against an explicit schema — field names, types, allowed values — before any field is read by business logic. Applies to JSON, YAML, XML, form bodies, message-queue payloads, and binary formats alike; format doesn't matter.
3. Artifacts are signature- or digest-verified before trust. Software updates, plugin loads, CI-artifact downloads: check a cryptographic signature against a trusted public key, or a digest against a pinned hash, before executing or loading.
4. Keys and pinned hashes come from outside the source tree — environment variable, secrets manager, OS keystore, or a build-time constant baked into the binary. A value received as a function parameter with no visible origin does not demonstrate this.

Verification

Confirm these properties hold for every relevant pattern present:

• No code-executing deserializer (pickle, marshal, shelve, ObjectInputStream.readObject, Marshal.load, unserialize, BinaryFormatter, unsafe yaml.load) receives attacker-reachable bytes. Safe formats (JSON, safe-mode YAML, protobuf) may accept untrusted input if the next criterion is met.
• Every deserialized object produced from untrusted input is validated against an explicit schema — field names, types, allowed values — before any field reaches business logic
• For every software-update, plugin-load, or CI-artifact download, the artifact's signature or digest is verified before it is executed, loaded, or written to a trusted path
• Verification keys and pinned hashes are read from an environment variable, secrets manager, OS keystore, or build-time constant — not hardcoded literals in source, and not opaque function parameters

References

• CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data)
• CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity)
• OWASP A08:2025 – Software and Data Integrity Failures