Operating Inside an Agent Sandbox

Agent Sandbox runs AI coding agents inside a locked-down local container. If you are reading this from inside one, your network is restricted and your filesystem is partly read-only by design. This is not a bug. Knowing the rules lets you work with the sandbox instead of wasting turns fighting it.

This skill is generic. The authoritative, current constraints for your specific sandbox always live in the read-only .agent-sandbox/ directory in your project root. Read those files; do not rely on memory or assumptions.

Am I in a sandbox?

You are almost certainly inside an Agent Sandbox if any of these hold:

• HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY are set to http://proxy:8080.
• A read-only .agent-sandbox/ directory exists at the workspace root.
• You are the non-root user dev (uid 501) and lack general sudo.
• A proxy CA certificate is mounted at /etc/mitmproxy.

The network model (two enforcement layers)

1. Firewall (in your container). All direct outbound traffic is dropped. Only the Docker host network — which includes the proxy sidecar — is reachable. A direct connection that bypasses the proxy is rejected immediately (ICMP admin-prohibited), so it fails fast rather than hanging. SSH outbound is disabled.

2. Proxy (the proxy sidecar). All HTTP/HTTPS must go through http://proxy:8080. The standard proxy env vars are already set, so most tools (curl, git, package managers, language toolchains) use it automatically. The proxy enforces a domain/service allowlist. Anything not on the allowlist is blocked.

   • A blocked request returns HTTP 403 with body Blocked by proxy policy: <host>.
   • For HTTPS, the blocking CONNECT is refused before the tunnel opens.

The proxy is a TLS-terminating man-in-the-middle. Its CA cert is installed in the container's system trust store. Tools that use the system store just work. A tool that ships its own CA bundle (some Node, Python, Go setups) may report a certificate error — point it at the proxy CA file /etc/mitmproxy/ca.crt (e.g. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, SSL_CERT_FILE) rather than disabling verification.

Discover your actual limits

The single most useful file is the effective allowlist, written by the proxy:

• /run/agentbox/policy.yaml — the complete, sanitized list of hosts reachable through the proxy, with their allowed schemes/methods/paths. This is the merged result of every policy layer (agent baseline + user policy), rewritten on proxy startup and on each successful policy reload (SIGHUP). If a host is not in this file, requests to it return HTTP 403. Credentials and request-rewriting rules are intentionally omitted. (Older sandboxes may not export this file yet; if it is missing, fall back to the .agent-sandbox/ files below and to probing.)

For the editable inputs and your runtime config, read these under the read-only .agent-sandbox/ mount:

• active-target.env — which agent is active and the project name.
• policy/user.policy.yaml — shared user-owned allowlist (applies to every agent).
• policy/user.agent.<agent>.policy.yaml — extra allowlist for the active agent only.
• compose/base.yml and compose/agent.<agent>.yml — mounts, volumes, and env you run with.

Note: the .agent-sandbox/policy/*.yaml files show only the user-editable layer. Each agent also has a baseline allowlist (its own API, auth, and CDN endpoints) that is merged in but is not authored in these files. The baseline is reflected in /run/agentbox/policy.yaml. When unsure whether a host is allowed, check that file, or just try the request and read the result.

Allowlist entries take two forms:

services:          # symbolic bundles, e.g. github, claude — expand to known host sets
  - github
domains:           # explicit hosts; wildcards like "*.example.com" are allowed
  - raw.githubusercontent.com

Quick checks you can run

# Should succeed only if the GitHub API is allowed for this repository (the
# allowlist is scoped to repository paths, so the API root itself returns 403):
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO

# A 403 body of "Blocked by proxy policy: <host>" means the host is not allowed.
# A direct (non-proxy) attempt is refused by the firewall, not the proxy:
curl --noproxy '*' --connect-timeout 3 https://example.com   # expected to fail

What you cannot do (stop and don't retry)

• You cannot change network policy from inside the container. .agent-sandbox/ is mounted read-only, and policy only takes effect after a proxy reload or restart, which is a host-side action. Editing those files from inside will fail or have no effect.
• The agentbox CLI is not yours to run — it runs on the host, not in this container.
• You cannot bypass the firewall or proxy. No SSH, no direct sockets, no alternate egress. Retrying a blocked request, disabling TLS verification, or hunting for another route wastes turns and won't work.

What to do when something is blocked

1. Confirm the cause. Blocked by proxy policy: <host> = host not on the allowlist. A connection refused/admin-prohibited on a direct attempt = firewall; route it through the proxy instead (usually automatic via the env vars).

2. Check whether the host is already allowed in /run/agentbox/policy.yaml (or, failing that, .agent-sandbox/policy/*.yaml).

3. Prefer an allowlisted alternative if one exists (e.g. a mirror or registry that is already permitted).

4. If you genuinely need a blocked host, ask the human rather than working around it. Give them the exact host(s) and a ready-to-paste snippet, e.g.:

   I need outbound access to pypi.org and files.pythonhosted.org. Add to .agent-sandbox/policy/user.policy.yaml:

   domains:
     - pypi.org
     - files.pythonhosted.org
   

   Then on the host run agentbox proxy reload to apply it (or agentbox compose restart proxy). (agentbox policy config shows the effective allowlist.)

Filesystem and git

• /workspace is your project and is writable. .agent-sandbox/ is read-only.
• Git remotes are rewritten from SSH to HTTPS, and outbound git goes through the proxy. Push/pull works only for repos the policy allows.
• Credentials are injected at the proxy via credential shims; you will not see raw tokens as env vars, and you do not need them — authenticated requests to allowed services are handled for you. Env vars such as GH_TOKEN=agentbox-proxy-managed are placeholders the proxy replaces in flight. Leave them alone.

GitHub issues, pull requests, and CI

If api.github.com appears in /run/agentbox/policy.yaml, you can read and write issues and pull requests for the allowed repository with gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/.... The high-level gh pr and gh issue commands use GraphQL and are blocked; do not retry them. Read github-api.md next to this file for the validated commands, paging, and what stays blocked.

Bottom line

Treat blocks as guardrails carrying information, not obstacles to defeat. Read .agent-sandbox/ to learn the rules, prefer what's already allowed, and when you truly need more access, hand the human a precise, minimal request they can apply on the host.