Security Threat Model

SkillSecurity

Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.

Available today. Use it from your connected AI after setup.

Add ahel to your AI once: Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Claude Code or Codex. Then ask it to use this.

Then ask your AI: use the Security Threat Model skill

What this skill tells your AI

The instructions your AI receives, as published by majiayu000/spellbook in skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.

Purpose

Use this skill before implementing or approving security-sensitive changes. It complements auth-security and server-security by mapping assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and concrete controls.

Scope First

Identify:

  1. Assets: credentials, tokens, user data, tenant data, money movement, admin actions.
  2. Actors: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant admin, internal operator, compromised dependency.
  3. Trust boundaries: browser/server, service/service, tenant/tenant, CI/runtime, third-party callbacks.
  4. Entry points: API routes, CLI commands, jobs, webhooks, uploads, config files.
  5. Existing controls: validation, authz, rate limits, audit logs, secret storage.

Threat Checklist

Check at least:

  • Spoofing: can an identity, tenant, callback, or service be forged?
  • Tampering: can payloads, configs, migrations, artifacts, or logs be altered?
  • Repudiation: is there an audit trail for sensitive actions?
  • Information disclosure: can secrets, PII, logs, or tenant data leak?
  • Denial of service: can expensive paths be amplified?
  • Elevation of privilege: can user or service permissions expand?
  • Supply chain: can dependencies, scripts, CI, or generated files introduce risk?

Required Controls

Every finding needs one of:

  • preventive control in production code,
  • detective control with alerting,
  • compensating manual control with owner and expiry,
  • explicit accepted risk with rationale.

Do not accept "warn and continue" for authz, secrets, tenant isolation, injection, or payment/security-critical failures.

Output Shape

scope:
assets:
trust_boundaries:
entry_points:
threats:
required_controls:
tests_or_probes:
residual_risks:
review_gate:

For implementation work, include exact files and verification commands that prove the controls are active.

Signals

GitHub stars
285
Forks
26
Last commit
Sep 2026
Advanced
Item type
skill
Key
security-threat-model-majiayu000
Source
github.com/majiayu000/spellbook