Phishing assessment

SkillCommunication

Run an authorized phishing / spear-phishing assessment that measures human-factor risk, pretext, delivery, landing page, and tracking, without harming staff or hoarding real data. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is email-based (click, credential submission, or report rate). Signals: "phishing test", "simulated phishing", "test click rate", "credential harvesting assessment", awareness-campaign objective.

Instructions available. Your AI can read the instructions. Execution depends on the setup they require.

Add ahel to your AI once: Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Claude Code or Codex. Then ask it to use this.

Then ask your AI: use the Phishing assessment skill

What this skill tells your AI

The instructions your AI receives, as published by noorqureshi/sploitagent in skills/social-eng/social-eng-phishing/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.

When it applies

The engagement authorizes an email human-factor test and you've cleared social-eng-methodology (authorization, allowed pretext themes, target boundaries, no-harm line). The goal is a measurement — click rate, credential-submission rate, and, most importantly, the report rate — not to embarrass anyone.

Why it works

Phishing exploits trust and context, not a software bug: a message that looks like it comes from a trusted source, with a plausible reason to act now, gets clicks even from trained users. Measuring that safely tells the client where awareness and technical controls (MFA, mail filtering, reporting tooling) need to improve.

Method

  1. Pick the objective and metric. Awareness baseline (did they click?), credential resilience (did they submit?), or reporting culture (did they report it, and how fast?). The metric shapes the whole campaign.
  2. Scope the target list to authorized recipients only; segment (department/role) so results are actionable. Never add anyone outside the agreed boundaries.
  3. Design a proportionate pretext within the allowed themes (e.g. an internal IT/HR notice, a shared-document notification). Keep it believable but avoid excluded/harmful themes and real named individuals.
  4. Stand up tracked infrastructure. A dedicated sender domain and a landing page, every recipient carrying a unique token so clicks/submissions are attributable to the test. Use a framework built for this (e.g. GoPhish) so tracking and teardown are clean.
  5. Land safely. The page measures the action and then discloses it's an authorized assessment with a short awareness message. A credential form records "a credential was submitted" for the metric — it does not store, display, or reuse the real password.
  6. Deliver and measure over the agreed window; capture click/submit/report rates and time-to- report per segment.
  7. Tear down and clean up. Disable the infra, purge any captured data beyond the metric, and confirm nothing is left reachable.

Gotchas

  • Never keep real credentials. Record the event, not the secret; a test that stockpiles staff passwords has itself become the risk.
  • Report rate is the win metric — a high report rate is a healthy result; frame it that way, don't optimize purely for clicks.
  • Coordinate with the blue team/help desk per RoE so a real incident response isn't triggered (or, if testing detection, so it's an intended part of the exercise).
  • Aggregate results. The report improves controls and training; it does not name and shame individuals.
  • Excluded themes stay excluded — no fake emergencies, layoffs, or bonuses; proportionality is a hard limit from social-eng-methodology.

Verify success

A clean metric set (click / submission / report rates, time-to-report) attributable to the test, with all pretext infrastructure torn down and no real personal data retained — feeding an awareness-focused writeup (reporting-pentest-report).

References

MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001/.002, T1598.003; GoPhish documentation; awareness-program metrics guidance.

Signals

GitHub stars
20
Forks
7
Last commit
Sep 2026
Advanced
Item type
skill
Key
social-eng-phishing
Source
github.com/noorqureshi/sploitagent