Training Data Poisoning Security Check (OWASP LLM03:2025)
SkillDev toolsDetects training and fine-tuning pipelines that ingest external data without
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What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by thejefflarson/soundcheck in .claude/skills/training-data-poisoning/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.
What this checks
Protects against malicious or low-quality examples being introduced into training or fine-tuning datasets. Poisoned data can embed backdoors, degrade accuracy, or skew model behavior in ways that are difficult to detect after training completes.
Vulnerable patterns
- Ingesting scraped or user-contributed examples with no content validation
- No deduplication or anomaly detection on training set statistics
- Loading dataset files without verifying provenance or checksums
- Using the same split for training and validation, hiding distribution shift
Fix immediately
Flag the vulnerable code, explain the risk, and suggest a fix establishing these properties. Translate to the data-loading and validation libraries of the audited file — use that stack's documented hashing, schema, and dataframe APIs; do not import a recipe from a different stack.
- Every external dataset file is checksum-verified before use. A pinned SHA-256 in version control; the loader computes the digest on load and refuses to proceed on mismatch. Pinning a URL or version alone does not help when the bytes behind them change.
- Every example passes content validation before entering the training set: type and length checks, disallowed-pattern filtering for known injection or jailbreak markers, and encoding/Unicode sanity. Invalid examples are dropped, not silently used.
- Duplicates are removed before training. Poisoning attacks often batch the same backdoor trigger across many examples; deduplication by content hash limits the leverage of a single injected payload.
- Label distribution is checked and alerts fire on imbalance above a threshold. A sudden one-class shift is a statistical signature of bulk-inserted poison; it is cheap to catch at ingestion and impossible to reverse after training.
- Train and validation splits come from disjoint sources or time windows. Reusing the same split for both hides distribution shift and lets poisoned examples score well on validation.
Verification
Confirm the response:
- For every external dataset load present, files are verified against pinned checksums before use
- Every training example passes content validation (length limits, disallowed-pattern filtering)
- Duplicates are removed before training starts
- For every dataset with categorical labels present, class distribution is checked and alerted on imbalance above a threshold
- Train and validation splits come from disjoint sources or time windows
References
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 20
- Last commit
- Jul 2026
Advanced
- Catalog kind
- skill
- Gateway key
training-data-poisoning- Source
- github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck