Unsafe API Consumption Check (API10:2023)
SkillDev toolsDetects code that consumes third-party API responses without type validation
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Then ask your AI: use the Unsafe API Consumption Check (API10:2023) skill
What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by thejefflarson/soundcheck in .claude/skills/unsafe-api-consumption/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.
What this checks
Protects against blindly trusting data from third-party APIs. External API responses can be tampered with (via MITM, compromised provider, or supply-chain attack), contain unexpected types or malicious payloads, or change without notice. Treating external data as trusted leads to injection, deserialization attacks, and business logic bypass.
Vulnerable patterns
- External API response fields flowing directly into SQL, shell, template, or code-execution sinks via string interpolation
- Rendering third-party HTML or markdown without a sanitization step
- Merging unvalidated external response objects into internal models
- Following redirect URLs returned by an external API without re-validating against the same allowlist
- Calling external APIs without size limits or timeouts, allowing a partner to stream gigabytes or hang the caller
Fix immediately
Flag the vulnerable code, explain the risk, and suggest a fix establishing these properties. Translate to the HTTP client, schema library, and template engine of the audited file — use that stack's documented validation, sanitization, and redirect controls; do not import a recipe from a different stack.
- Every response is validated against an explicit schema — typed struct, schema validator, JSON Schema, protobuf message, or equivalent — before any field reaches business logic. Optional fields get defaults; unexpected fields are rejected or ignored, not silently propagated.
- External data never reaches injection sinks via string interpolation. SQL goes through parameterized queries; HTML goes through an auto-escaping template engine; shell goes through argv arrays. Validation does not exempt the sink.
- Response size is bounded and the request has a timeout. A partner API can stream gigabytes or hang forever; both eat resources and can DoS the caller.
- Redirects are not followed blindly. Either disable redirects, or re-validate each hop against the same allowlist used for the initial URL. Partner-controlled 3xx responses can redirect to SSRF targets or attacker-controlled hosts.
Verification
- Every response from an external API is validated against a schema before any field is used in queries, rendering, or business logic
- External API data never reaches SQL, shell, template, or code-execution sinks via string interpolation — only through parameterized/auto-escaping interfaces
- HTTP responses from external APIs are size-limited and the request has a timeout
- Redirects from external API responses are either disabled or re-validated at each hop against the same allowlist used for the initial URL
References
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 20
- Last commit
- Jul 2026
Advanced
- Catalog kind
- skill
- Gateway key
unsafe-api-consumption- Source
- github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck