Insecure Output Handling Security Check (OWASP LLM02:2025)

What this checks

Protects against XSS, command injection, and second-order injection that arise when LLM output is treated as trusted. The model may produce malicious content through prompt injection or hallucination; downstream systems must sanitize it the same way they would sanitize raw user input.

Vulnerable patterns

• LLM response assigned to a raw-HTML sink (innerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html, server-side mark_safe) without sanitization
• LLM-generated code or shell string passed to eval, exec, or a subprocess call with shell expansion enabled
• LLM output interpolated into a SQL or NoSQL query string instead of bound as a parameter
• LLM-produced markdown rendered to HTML without an allowlist-based sanitizer
• LLM response forwarded to a downstream API or webhook without re-validating against the destination's schema

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Translate the principles below to the audited file's language, UI framework, and database driver — use that stack's documented escaping, sanitizer, and parameter-binding APIs.

For each finding, establish these properties:

1. Treat LLM output as untrusted input at every consumption point. The same escaping, parameterization, and allowlisting rules that apply to user input apply here — prompt injection makes the model a proxy for attacker content.
2. HTML rendering uses a safe sink. Plain-text sink or auto-escaping template for prose; an allowlist-based sanitizer for rich content. Never a raw-HTML sink with an unsanitized LLM string.
3. Shell and code execution require an allowlist. If the LLM picks an action, the handler validates it against a static set of permitted commands and invokes them with argv arrays — never with shell expansion enabled, never through a dynamic-evaluation primitive.
4. Database queries are parameterized. LLM output lands in bind variables, not string-interpolated into the statement. For injection details, see the injection skill.

Verification

Confirm the response:

• No LLM string is assigned to a raw-HTML sink without going through an allowlist-based sanitizer
• Shell execution uses an allowlist; shell-expansion modes are never used with LLM-derived input
• If the code routes LLM output into a database query, the query uses parameterized placeholders — not string interpolation or concatenation with the LLM-derived value. Skip this criterion when the code does not execute any database query.
• LLM output is treated as untrusted user input at every consumption point

References

• CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting)
• CWE-116 (Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output)
• OWASP LLM02:2025 Insecure Output Handling